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The purpose of this paper is to propose, justify and explain the
properties of a class of linear programming (hereafter "LP") approaches
to long-term, corporate financial planning under uncertainty. The models
discussed are novel in the following respects.
1. They are directly based on a theory of market equilibrium
under uncertainty. Thus the capabilities of the models to deal
with choice among risky assets and liabilities can be rigorously
justified, assuming that the firm's objective is to maximize
share price. Past linear programming models have been con-
structed assuming certainty, and have dealt with some aspects
of uncertainty through heuristic modifications.
''Work on this paper was supported in part by a Ford Foundation grant
to the Sloan School of Research in business finance. I am grateful for
this assistance.
The paper was greatly improved by comments of my colleagues at the
Sloan School, particularly G. A. Pogue, with whom I am working on models
for practical application.
The deficiencies of this paper are my own.
Assistant Professor of Finance, Sloan School of Management, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology.
^Probably the most important contributions are those of Weingartner [24]
and Charnes, Cooper and Miller [4]. See also Weingartner ' s survey article
[23].

2. The models yield simultaneous solutions for the firm's optimal
financing and investment decisions. The financing decision is
not considered "with the investment decision given," nor vice-
versa.
3. Some practical difficulties associated with the cost of capital
concept are avoided. The traditional weighted average cost
of capital does not appear in these LP models.
The first two characteristics should lead to some interest in the
mosels as theory; the third, along with the ease of solution of LP problems,
should generate interest in the models as practical decision-making tools.
However, this paper does not include a detailed model for practical appli-
cation.
The paper is organized as follows. The general linear format is ex-
plained in the next section. The key assumption justifying it is that the
structure of security prices at equilibrium is best described by the class
of security valuation models which imply risk- independence of financing
and investment options. The following section examines a simple model in
detail, and contrasts the LP approach with "traditional" approaches using
the cost of capital. Practical inplications of the model are discussed in
the third section.
I. THE LINEAR FORMAT FOR FINANCIAL PLANNING
Introduction
We will consider the firm's financial planning problem in the follow-
ing terms. The firm begins with a certain initial package of assets and

liabilities. For a brand-new firm, this may be simply money in the bank
and stock outstanding. For a going concern, the package will be much more
con5)licated. Any firm, however, has the opportunity to change the charac-
teristics of its initial package by transactions in real or financial
assets. The problem is to determine which set of transactions for the ini-
tial period will maximize the firm's stock price.
We will be concerned primarily with long-lived assets and liabilities,
so the optimal transactions for the initial period will reflect the firm's
opportunities and strategy in subsequent periods. Therefore, I have
characterized the firm's problem as long-range financial planning, even
though tomorrow's decisions do not have to be made today.
Assuming linearity, the firm's objective function is:
n m
(1) Y = ^ xjAj + ^, yjFj
j=l j=l
where Y = change in stock price
Xj = decision variable for the jth investment project --
i.e., j^" real asset option, xj = 1 indicates that
the project is accepted.
Aj = change in stock price if project j is accepted;
in other words, project j's present value.
y^ = decision variable for the jth financing option,
y:: = 1 means that one dollar of financing is ob-
tained from the jth source.
Fj = the change in stock price per dollar of financing
obtained from source j
.
What is implied by stating the firm's objective in this way? First,
clearly, maximization of current share price must be an acceptable objective.
Second, we assume that acceptance of option j leads to a definite change

in stock price. In other words, a financing or investment option with
uncertain returns does not have an uncertain value; the "market's" pref-
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erences are well-defined.
Third, we assume that the change in stock price due to accepting
option j is independent of management's decisions regarding other invest-
ment or financing options. Clearly, this assumption is crucial to the
argument and requires close examination.
Are the Investment Options Mutually Interdependent ?
If Ai is to be independent of decision variables for other projects,
then the cash flows of project j cannot be causally related to what other
assets are acquired. If this is true for all projects, 1, 2, . .
.
, n,
then all are physically independent in the same sense G.M. and Ford shares
are independent from the point of view of an investor: although these
securities' returns may be statistically related. Ford's actual future
prices and dividends are not affected by whether or not the investor buys
G.M. stock.
Assuming physical independence means that the linear format cannot
deal directly with an important class of capital budgeting problems. Sup-
pose, for example, that investment options 1 and 2 are, respectively, a
fleet of new trucks and a computer. If the trucks are purchased, then pur-
chase of the computer will allow management to schedule usage of the trucks
more efficiently. For this reason, the change in stock price if both pro-
jects 1 and 2 are accepted is greater than the sum of their present values
^This assumption is innocuous, but worth stating because of the common
assumption that present value should be regarded as a random variable under
uncertainty.

separately considered. An interaction effect exists.
Writing the objective function as Eq. (1) also assumes that projects
are risk- independent , in the sense that there are no statistical relation-
ships among projects' returns such that some combinations of projects
affect stock price by an amount different than the sum of their present
values considered separately. In particular, risk-independence implies
that there is no advantage to be gained by corporate diversification.-^
I have shown elsewhere [13] that risk-independence is a necessary con-
dition for equilibrium in security markets. Naturally, the proof rests
on certain assun^tions about the markets -- in particular that, equili-
brium security prices conform to the time-state-preference model of
security valuation, advanced by me in still another paper [14]. Although
there is some controversy, the Sharpe-Lintner model of security valuation
under uncertainty also implies risk independence. See [20], [9], The
proof is given in Appendix A. " •
The meaning of risk-independence may be illustrated by considering
a bundle of risky assets, denoted by A, and two additional "projects" B
and C. (The projects represent given streams of uncertain, incremental
cash flows. Physical independence is assumed. However, no restriction is
placed on the distribution of cash flow over time, or on the projects'
characteristics.) Risk-independence requires that
^"Diversification" as used here simply means "pooling of risks" in the
context of portfolio selection.
u,intner, however, has argued that investment projects are not risk-
independent in his model — specifically, that "the problem of determining
the best capital budget of any given size is formally identical to the so-
lution of a security portfolio analysis." [7], p. 65.

where P^ is the price per share if neither E or C is accepted, Py^ the
price if only B is accepted, and so on. My proof^ of Eq. (2) establishes
that the change in stock price if B is adopted is independent of whether
C is also adopted, and therefore that the projects are risk-independent.
Whether risk-independence is a property of actual security markets
is a question that cannot be answered here, although it seems reasonable
to expect at very least a tendency toward this result. In any case, the
in^lications of risk-independence are worth considering. Therefore, we
shall assume it to exist for purposes of this paper.
Are Financing Options Mutually Independent ?
If no restrictions are placed on the risk characteristics or pat-
tern over time of B or C's cash flows, then Eq. (2) applies as well to
financial assets as to real ones. Project B can be regarded as a bond
issue, and C as a stock issue, without changing the proof in the slightest,
Having assumed risk-independence among real assets, it is no further step
to assume that financial assets are likev/ise risk-independent.
Physical independence among financial assets may seem to be another
matter. It is commonplace that the interest and principal payments on
bonds are affected by the size of the firm's equity base. A highly
levered firm may encounter difficulties servicing its debt, and creditors
will demand a higher promised yield in compensation. Conversely, returns
to equity depend on conmitments to creditors. Therefore "debt," if it is
%ee Myers [13].

regarded as a single financing option , is not physically independent of
equity issues.
This difficulty disappears if a range of financing options is speci-
fied and constraints are added to rule out options made inappropriate by
investment or other financing choices. Many different options can be
grouped under the heading "long term debt," for example, ranging from
practically riskless to highly speculative ones. Which of these options
are feasible depends on other financing and investment decisions. But
financing options so defined can be treated as both risk- independent and
physically independent.
Are Financing Options Independent of Investment Options, and Vice Versa ?
The proof of risk- independence applies when investment and financing
projects are considered simultaneously. Certain inter-relationships must
nevertheless be allowed for.
1. The firm's choice of assets determines the risk characteristics of its
aggregate liabilities. Or, from a different point of view, we can
say that the firm potentially can choose among a large number of finan-
cial assets, but that many combinations of real and financial options
are infeasible — e.g.. Fledgling Electronics Corporation could not
enjoy a 2:1 debt-equity ratio and simultaneously issue AAA bonds.
2. The firm's financing strategy can affect the returns produced by its
real assets. Most dramatic is the case of bankruptcy due to large
debt-servicing requirements. The real costs apparently associated with
In practice, it is sufficient to identify a handful of debt classes
to capture the major differences.

bankruptcy' may be attributed to financing decisions, providing bank-
ruptcy could have been avoided by a more conservative financial
structure.
Investors will take the likelihood of bankruptcy into account in
assessing the value of a firm's securities. They will also consider
the possibility that management will incur real costs in avoiding
bankruptcy if it seems imminent in some future contingency. Conse-
quently, firms' market values will reflect the "financial risk" it
undertakes. This is inconsistent with a linear objective function,.
since financial risk depends on the firm's overall financing and in-
vestment strategy, not simply on the individual options undertaken.
The LP format can be preserved in spite of these difficulties by us-
ing constraints to express the interrelationships. The simplest arrange-
ment is to require that total debt not exceed debt capacity , which in turn,
is related to the risk characteristics of the firm's real assets and the
amount of equity backing provided. This provides a framework for assess-
ing financial risk and imputing the value of bankruptcy costs. Simultane-
ously, it provides means to rule out inconsistent financing-investment
packages, such as Fledgling Electronics' AAA bonds.
The required constraints are discussed in more detail in Sections II
and III below. .'
A Comment on Risk-Independence and the Modigliani-Miller Propositions
The statement that financing and investment decisions are risk-
^See Baxter [1], and Robichek and Myers [18], esp. pp. 15-22.

independent is closely related to the well-known Modigliani-Miller (MM)
propositions. These require that "the cutoff rate [minimum permissable
rate of return] for investment in the firm
. . . will be completely
unaffected by the type of security used to finance the investment."^
As may be expected^ quite similar arguments support risk-independence
and the MM propositions. However, the two hypotheses are not identical.
MM assert not only that financing and investment options are (risk) inde-
pendent, but also that the present value of debt is zero (in a tax-free
world) or equal to the present value of debt-related tax savings (in
actuality). Their hypothesis is, therefore, disproved if the present val-
ue of debt financing is observed to be different from the present value
of the associated tax savings. However, this observation would not neces-
sarily in^ily that financing and investment options are risk-dependent. In
other words, proof of the MM propositions is sufficient, but not necessary
Q
to prove risk-independence.
^[12], p. 288. MM intend this statement to apply only in a no-tax
world. When corporate taxes exist, the cutoff rate in their model depends
on financial leverage.
In the LP model MM's statement is true regardless of the tax environ-
ment -- true, that is, in terms of the objective function. Eq. (1) implies
that the present values of financing and investment options are mutually
independent. However, the firm's financing and investment decisions are re-
lated through the LP constraints. This will be made more clear in Sections
II and III below.
To see this, remember that the proof of risk independence is identical
regardless of whether real assets, financial assets or both are considered.
The fact that investment proposals are risk-independent says nothing about
whether the proposals' present values are large or small. That financing
options are risk-independent likewise says nothing about which of these
options are most valuable.
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Admittedly, disproof of the MM propositions could raise reasonable
doubts about the existence of risk-independence, because the assumed mar-
ket processes on which the two hypotheses are based are similar.
The Meaning of Present Value for Financing; Decisions
Before going into further detail it may be helpful to give some
concrete meaning to the concept "present value" for financing options.
(We usually examine the cost of financing, measured by the expected rates
of return required by investors who contribute capital.)
Consider the firm's equilibrium stock price, P(0), at the start of
period t = 0. P(0) is the present value of the stream of dividends
R(0), R(l),
. . ., R(t), etc. Adoption of project j changes the dividend
stream by j's cash flows, a^-j^, 3.^2, .... The cash flows are, of course,
measured net of corporate income taxes.
Assuming che project is a real asset, the change in P(0), or present
value, associated with it is usually computed as
(3) 111.
where a^{; = the mean of a^j., and , ..
f(j)
= the discount rate for a stream of cash flows with
project j's risk characteristics.
At equilibrium, p(j) is determined by the expected rate of return offered
by securities with risk characteristics similar to project j's.
•^^This is the most common format for computing present value. It is
adopted here for convenience of exposition. See, however, Robichek and
Myers [16].
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The rate p(j) is not a weighted average cost of capital. The
project's cash flows are assumed to affect the firm's dividends directly,
without modification by any intervening financing arrangements. The rele-
vant question is, "What is the market value of project j?" not "What is
the market value of project j when financed by the normal proportion of
debt?"
Exactly the same procedure can be applied to determine the present
value of financing options. They are unusual only in that the initial
cash flow (fin) will usually be positive and future expected ca'sh flows
(f^j.) negative or zero. As for real assets, the appropriate discount rate
is determined by expected equilibrium rates of return on other (financial)
assets with similar risk characteristics.
The cash flows of the financing option are also assimied to affect
the firm's dividends directly -- there is no presunption that proceeds of
the financing are used to finance real assets.
Thus the treatments of real and financial assets are symmetrical.
As a practical matter, computation of the present value per dollar
of a financing option is substantially eased by using the following obser-
vation as a banchraark: _in perfect markets, the present value of all fi -
nancing options is zero
.
The proof of this statement is not at all difficult. By definition,
all participants in perfect markets have access to the same trading oppor-
tunities at the same prices, and no single participant affects prices by
his own actions. Thus a firm wishing to issue a bond, for example, is forced
to do so on exactly the same terms as other firms (or individuals). Our
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hj'pothetical firm will be able to issue bonds priced to yield the equi-
librium market rate established for bonds with its risk characteristics
— no more, no less. But then the expected yield on the new bonds is ex-
actly equal to the appropriate discount rate and the bonds' present value
is zero.
This argument clearly can be applied to any type of generally traded
financial asset.
Financial markets are not absolutely perfect, of course, but it is
easiest to start with the presumption that Fj = 0, and then consider how
any in^jrefections change this figure. Two of the most important effects
are:
1. Costs of issue should be subtracted from present value. In practice,
this reduces the present value of both bond and stock issues, stock
issues by the greater amount.
2. However, the tax advantages of corporate debt increase its present
value. Thus F^ should reflect the present value of the tax savings
associated with a debt option j. For example, suppose a $1000 per-
petuity is issued at an interest cost of 7.0 percent. The tax-
deductability of interest will generate yearly tax savings of $35
per year, assuming the corporate income tax rate is .50. Thus, the
present value of this financing option is:
1000 + 7^ - 757 = 500.
''The tax savings are discounted at 7 percent on the grounds that the
risk characteristics of the tax savings are equivalent to those of the in-
terest payments. Various adjustments could be considered — e.g., for tax-
loss carry forwards, for the difference between promised and expected inter-
est rates, etc. However, the procedure shown is reasonable for most practi-
cal purposes.
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The present value per dollar of financing from this source would be
entered in the objective function of the linear program (Eq. (1))
as Fj = $.50.
II. ANALYSIS OF A SIMPLE LP MODEL
The rudimentary example discussed in this section assumes the firm
has open to it only one financing option^ simply "debt," and that its fi-
nancing problem is only to choose the stock of debt outstanding in each
period from t = to t = H, the horizon. However, the planned stock of
debt cannot exceed "debt capacity" in any of these periods.
The LP problem is:
(4) Max ,. n H
f = I XjAj + 2. yt^tXj, yj ' j=i t=o
subject to:
• ft = ^t " ^t - °' ^^^' 1. • • -^ "^
j = x. - 1 :f 0, j=l, 1, . . ., n.
J
Here Z^. is defined as debt capacity for period t.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimal solution are as follows.
(5) if/^x. - I >t4^ - l,A±L £ 0, all j,
<3yt
The variables A^ and ^: are the imputed costs associated with the con-
straints <|'^ and ^., respectively. Substituting for the partial deriva-
tives, the conditions are
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H
(5a) Aj + ^ At^it -
-^i - 0,
t=0
-^
Ft . A t ^ 0.
where (3 Z^-/ J xj is written more simply as Z
If we assume that corporate income is taxed, then F^ ^ for all t.
Obviously the optimal solution will include as much debt as possible in
every future period, and the constraints 0^ will be binding. The Kuhn-
Tucker conditions also require, therefore, that F(- - ,A j. = 0, or Ff- = ^ (-.
This supports the further simplification
H
(6) Aj + £, ZjtFt - ;»j ^ 0.
~
" t=0
Eq. (6) implies that the contribution of project j to stock price is
measured by A-, the "intrinsic" value of the project plus the present
value of the additional debt the project supports. If Aj + ^ ^jt^t -^ ^
then the project should be accepted (if so, \ : > and Eq. (6) is an
equality); if Aj + £ ZjtFt '^ then the project should be rejected (if so,
/j = and Eq. (6) is an inequality).
Example
Table 1 shows two hypothetical projects, each evaluated according to
Eq. (6). Both projects lead to roughly the same total change in stock
price, but for different reasons.
After the initial investment is made both projects generate cash
flows over a ten-year period. For project 1, Aj = $10. Thus, the project
is worthwhile even if debt financing is not available. However, management
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estimates that 20 percent of the project's required investment can be
financed by debt -- in other words^ the project increases the firm's to-
tal debt capacity by $20 in each period from t = 1 to t = 10. The inter-
est cost of additional debt is 7 percent. Taking the associated tax
12 '
savings into account, the projects total, or adjusted, value is
$10.00 + $4.92 = $14.92. '
Project 2 is not worthwhile for its own sake, but only because of
the additional debt capacity it creates. It is much less "risky" than 1
and can be 50 percent debt-financed. Project 2 is therefore worth
-$10.00 + $24.60 = $14.60.
Comparison to the Cost of Capital Concept
In a general way, the procedure just illustrated is equivalent to
the usual doctrine that the weighted average cost of capital is a declin-
ing function of financial leverage, providing that reasonable debt limits
are not exceeded. This doctrine implies that leveraged firms can under-
take less valuable projects than unleveraged firms, which Eq. (6) also
in5)lies.
Nevertheless, there are important differences between even this simple
LP model and the cost of capital approach. The cost of capital is usually
confuted as a single number reflecting (1) the risk characteristics of
the firm's existing assets and (2) the firm's existing financial structure,
presumably appropriate to existing assets. This figure is used directly
as a standard of profitability for new assets with risk characteristics
12
The Modigliani-Miller Hypothesis is assumed to hold. Thus the present
value of debt solely reflects the present value of associated tax savings.
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4) 4JCo fe
O -r-l 4J
^^ u -^
4J a, M
.-1 3
rt J2 ^ O < Tr-I
4J T-I O ,-1 vy II
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C w +
oO O -^
4-> <:
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similar to existing ones. Adjustments are made for assets with dissimi-
lar risk characteristics.
However^ it is not easy to arrive at the correct rate for all cases
purely by judgment. The adjustment should reflect not only (1) the risk
characteristics of the project in question, but also (2) the amount of
debt it will support (presumably riskier projects support less debt). The
second factor is usually ignored.
Despite wide use of the cost of capital concept. There are only a
few attempts to provide a logically complete procedure for arriving at
13
the required adjustments. In contrast, the LP approach takes projects'
risk characteristics and debt capacities into account simultaneously and
automatically. This is evident from the conditions for the optimal solu-
tion.
Further Comparison of LP and Cost of Capital Approaches
It will be of some interest to give a more precise idea of the range
of situations in which the LP and cost of capital approaches are equivalent.
Starting with the sirqjle LP model just described, we make three fur-
ther assunqjtions.
1. That all investment projects under consideration are perpetuities.
Thus Aj = flj/pCj) - Ij, where I- is the initial investment, aj is the
expected cash return required by the market for assets with j's risk
characteristics.
2. That projects' debt capacities are the same in all future periods. Thus
Zi^ = Z^, a constant for all t.
^^See Solomon [19] and Tuttle and Litzenberger [22],
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3, That the MM propositions hold. Thus the present value of the dollar's
worth of debt outstanding in period t is the tax saving in t dis-
i Tc
counted to the present; F^ = j. where T^ is the corporate income
tax rate and i is the bondholders' required rate of return.
Under these assumptions^ the optimal solution requires
H
p(j) t=l (l+i)t J
«
As H approaches infinity^ the project's contribution to stock price or "ad-
justed present value" is
(7) APVj = _!J_.I. +ZjT,
The project's APV is positive only if its expected rate of return a^/I^^
is greater than the cutoff rate «*; that is if:
(8) - - aj/lj > p* = p(j)(l-djTc),
where • "^j ~ ^j/^j •
This is exactly the cutoff rate recommended by MM, assuming project j has
risk characteristics similar to the firm's existing assets.
^The MM propositions in^ily [12, p, 268] that V, the aggregate market
value of the firm is
V = I/p + T^D,
where a is the expected after-tax cash flow of the firm, p the capitaliza-
tion rate appropriate to this stream and D the stock of debt (consols) cur-
rently outstanding. A small increase dl in the scale of the firm's assets
implies
,„ , , ,^dV _ 1 da , a, dD
dl p dl '^ dl
This action is acceptable if dV/dl ^ dl/dl = 1. Thus the minimum ac-
-;c da _ ,
P = dl -. f
captable rate of return da/dl is v _ /it ^\
which is equivalent to Eq. (8)
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Often the cutoff rate is computed as the weighted average cost of
capital:
(9)
P*
^
V
(l-Tc)i+|k,
where D = market value of debt,
E = market value of equity,
V = D + E, and
k = the cost of equity capital.
Equations (8) and (9) are equivalent if d. = D/V, project j's risk charac-
teristics are similar to those of the firm's existing assets, and k be-
haves as MM predict.
If the MM porpositions do not apply, use of a weighted average cost
of capital corresponds to a somewhat different LP model. The only major
change in assumptions is that F the present value of debt, would be dif-
ferent than the MM propositions indicate.
Summary; Assumptions of Cost of Capital Approaches
The discussion above shows that the linear programming procedure is
more generally applicable than cost of capital approaches. The Modigliani-
Miller cost of capital concept assumes:
1. The risk characteristics of the project under consideration are similar
to those of the firms' existing assets.
2. The MM propositions hold. i
3. The project under consideration is a perpetuity.
4. The projects' debt capacity is the same in all future periods.
Use of the weighted average cost of capital does not necessarily require
assun^tion (2). But it assumes in addition:
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5. The ratio of additional debt financing to the projects' adjusted
is the same
present value/as the ratio of existing debt to existing equity
(market value).
This is possibly not the definitive list of assumptions. Assumption
(5) may follow from the first four, and assumption (4) from the first
three. But the general point holds regardless. The cases in which the
MM and/or weighted average cost of capital approaches arrive at the same
present value for a project as the LP approach are rather special ones.
This does not imply the cost of capital approaches (either MM or weighted
average) always lead to wrong decisions when the various special assump-
tions they require are relaxed. Nevertheless, their use can lead to wrong
decisions in situations where the LP approach serves perfectly well.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Broadly speaking, this paper has two implications for practical de-
cisionmaking. First, the cost-of-capital framework for capital budgeting
decisions has been shown to be a special case which may well lead to
errors. Second, linear programming techniques are promising tools for
long-range financial planning, and deserve further investigation.
The second point does not call for immediate changes in practical
decisionmaking procedures. It is in5)ossible to specify a general LP
model appropriate for any firm's problems. Further, detailed design and
experimentation are prerequisites for actual use.
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But it is not necessary to wait for a usable LP model before dis-
carding or supplementing the cost of capital concept for capital budget-
ing purposes. This will be shown prior to more detailed discussion of
LP models.
A Simple Alternative to the Cost of Capital Framework
The following rule of thumb captures the most important capital bud-
geting implications of the LP framework: a project's total contribution
to shareholders' wealth equals its present value considered separately
plus the present value of tax savings due to additional debt supported by
the project. This is simply a prose statement of Eq. (6) above.
The rule of thumb implies a four-step evaluation of capital budgeting
projects:
1. Estimate the project's cash flow after taxes.
2. Assess the risk of the cash flows; choose the appropriate discount
rate ( pO; compute the project's present value (A^.
3. Assess the debt capacity of the project for future periods. Compute
the present value of the extra debt capacity generated by the project
4. Compute APVj^ the sum of Aj and ^ ZjtFt. Accept the project if APVj
is positive.
For more or less routine investments, projects might be assigned to
"risk classes." All projects in a risk class would be evaluated at the
same discount rate and "debt capacity factor." With four risk classes, the
numbers might look like this:

21
Risk Class
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Table 4
Major Components of a Practical LP Model
Item
Objective Function
Constraints
Examples
^ =
2>^jAj + ^yjFj + ^qjSj (10a)
Project acceptance Xj - 1
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fjj. = the expected cash flow per dollar of the j financing
option in period t;
S^ = slack or "dummy" variables;
qi = cost or penalty associated with S^;
bj. = expected autonomous cash flow in period t.
Zjj. = contribution of project j to corporate debt capacity at t.
D^j. = expected principal outstanding at t per dollar of borrow-
ing under debt option j;
X, = cash dividend payments in t.
Outline of a LP Model for Long-Range Financial Planning
.
The probable main features of practical LP models are discussed in
this section. My purpose here is not to specify the exact form of such a
model^ but to illustrate further how the ideas presented in this paper can
be applied to actual problems.
The objective function and each major class of constraint are illus-
trated in Table 4.
Objective Function
.
— Compared to Eq. (4), the objective function
has been expanded in two ways. First, a large number of distinct financ-
ing options is allowed for. In practice, financing options must be dis-
tinguished not only by the time when funds are obtained, but also by the
instrument used — e.g., stock issue vs. commercial paper vs. term loan.
Second, dummy and slack variables are introduced. For example, penalty
costs are assessed when the LP solution violates certain limits of safety,
convenience or practicality. Other dummy variables do not contribute
directly to the aggregate present value of the financial plan, but do so
indirectly by their role in the LP constraints.
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Pro.lect Acceptance
.
-- Equations like (10b) are intended to require
the program either to accept or reject each project. It does not do this
with complete reliability, of course. The decisionmaker using LP will be
forced to accept the possibility that the program will recommend accept-
ing, say, 29.1 percent of project j.
Means of dealing with mutually exclusive or contingent options have
been fully discussed by Weingartner. Equations (10c) and (lOd) convey
the essence of the approach. The former applies if options i and j are
mutually exclusive, the latter if feasibility of i is contingent on ac-
ceptance of j
.
Although these types of restrictions usually apply to investment
options, financing options may also be so restrained. For example, option
j could be purchase of real estate and option i a mortgage. It makes per-
fect sense to say that i is contingent on j.
Again, these constraints do not prevent the potential problem of
fractional projects accepted in the LP solution. For this, integer pro-
gramming -- or some other method of similar capabilities — is required.
Equality of Sources and Uses of Funds . — This is simply a requirement
of consistency on the plan. Note, however, that Eq. (lOe) requires
^^[24], pp. 32-34.
"Integer programming would also allow the decisionmaker to confront
con^jutational problems posed by economies of scale more directly. There
are substantial economies of scale in new stock issues, for exan^Jle, which
cannot be treated in a linear program.
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consistency only in terms of expected values; it does not establish the
plan's feasibility unless expectations are confirmed.
Debt Capacity
.
— In the most general sense^ the constraints on bor-
rowing shown in Table 3 sin^ily require that aggregate debt issued is less
than debt capacity. This is the same tack taken in Eq. (4). However,
there are a number of specific changes and assumptions,
1, A constant term is introduced to reflect any unused debt
capacity in the existing investment-financing package.
2, It is emphasized earlier in this paper that, although a firm
potentially can issue a large number of financial assets, many
combinations of real and financial assets are infeasible.
The most common problem is that a newly issued bond can be
anything from a blue-chip to a highly speculative security, de-
pending on the characteristics of the firm's assets and the
aggregate amount of debt outstanding. Since the present values
of blue chips and speculative bonds are likely to differ, the
LP program should insure that each is issued only in appropri-
ate circumstances.
One way to accomplish this is as follows. For each type
of debt financing, define three classes of financing options
These are associated with lov;, medium and high-risk borrowing
from the viewpoint of potential creditors. Thus, there will be
low, medium and high-risk term loans; low, medium and high-risk
bond issues^ and so on.
We now consider all low-risk debt options (Class 1) sepa-
rately. Equation (lOf) is intended to restrict the amount of
low-risk debt issued at t to that amount which can be supported
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with negligible chance of financial embarrasment. Aggregate
debt capacity, ^x.Z .^is defined with this stringent limit
in mind.
Equation (lOg) in turn restricts medium risk-debt. Aggre-
gate debt capacity is increased to ^ ^i^it "^ ^f "^^^ dummy
variable S is itself constrained — for example as a propor-
tion of £,XjZjj..
Similarly, Class 3 debt is limited to 7 XjZ.^. + S(. + S^'
by Eq. (lOh).
3, Tax advantages will usually justify borrowing even at the expense
of some likelihood of bankruptcy or insolvency. This is why
"risky" debt options (Classes 2 and 3) are included in the pro-
gram.
The factors determining the optimal debt level are shown
in Figure 2a, which plots V, the total market value of the firm,
against the amount of debt issued. The firm's choice of real
assets is taken as given, and the MM propositions assumed to
hold. At low levels of debt (Class 1 debt only) there is no
significant chance of bankiruptcy, and V increases by the full
present value of expected tax savings. As Class 1 debt is ex-
hausted, additional tax savings are somewhat offset by bank-
ruptcy costs, which eventually increase rapidly with additional
borrowing. The optimum is reached at point Y.
Figure 2b shows how bankruptcy costs are treated in the LP
program. As Class 2 debt is issued S^. increases at a cost per
dollar of qt. A cost per
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dollar q^. is applied to Class 3 debt by means of the duinray
variable S^. Figure 2b is thus a piecewise linear approxima-
mation of the bankruptcy cost component of Figure 2a.
The dashed line in Figure 2c shows as a function of the
total amount borrowed^ holding debt capacity constant. For
purposes of the LP program, a stepwise approximation (solid lines)
would be used.
Expression of the firm's aggregate debt capacity as
^'^]^]t>
the sum of each project's debt capacity, may well be a strong
assuii5)tion. If, for example, debt capacity is determined by the
standard deviation of the fiirm's aggregate cash flow, then it is
certainly not correct to say that the whole is eqioal to the sum
of the parts.
There are several traps in estimating marginal interest rates. If
Class 2 debt is fully subordinate to Class 1 debt, then an extra dollar
of Class 2 debt should not change the market's evaluation of planned or
existing Class 1 debt. (The only possible link is through bankruptcy costs,
which are treated separately.) In this case the direct interest cost of
Class 2 debt is also the marginal cost of the issue. This convenience
does not occur in the absense of subordination.
•'"Even if this is true there are promising avenues of approach. For
example, the firm could be regarded as a portfolio of projects subject to
Sharpe's "diagonal model" of security performance. See [21]. This would
postulate one common factor (company sales?) affecting all projects' cash
flows. Debt capacity for each project would be inversely related to the
project's dependence on the common factor.
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Dividend Policy
.
— It is now widely accepted that dividend policy is
19irrelevant in perfect capital markets. If this is taken as a first
approximation^ then dividend policy is easily handled in the LP format.
We treat each period's aggregate dividend payment as an investment which
yields no cash returns to the firm^ but nevertheless has a net present
value of zero. Then the LP program will accept all investments with posi-
tive present values and will treat dividend payments as a residual.
This is the appropriate strategy when dividend policy is irrelevant.
However, there are a number of reasons why dividend policy may be re-
garded as relevant. First is the different rates at which investors'
capital gains and regular income are taxed. This factor is ignored in the
present model.
Second, are the alleged market imperfections which lead investors
to prefer high dividend payouts to low ones. Dividends may be assigned
positive, rather than zero, present values if this is the case.
Third, is the informational content of dividends. Changes in dividends
seem to be regarded as signals of changes in the firm's long-run profita-
bility. Therefore, dividends are cut only when financial difficulties
force it, and raised only when it is reasonably clear that the increase
can be maintained.
The easiest way to reflect the informational content of dividends is
to constrain aggregate dividends in period t to be no less than in period
See Eq. (lOi).
t - 1./ We may allow the program to violate the constraint, but at a
penalty cost.
^^For the original proofs of the proposition, see Miller and Modigliani
[10] and Lintner [6].
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Unfortunately, this strategy is inappropriate when the firm issues
new equity. The informational content of dividends is really associated
with dividends per share . Thus, it is not appropriate to constrain aggre-
gate dividends when the number of shares is variable. The number of shares
outstanding, given an equity issue of fixed amount, depends on share price,
among other things; share price in turn depends on the anticipated value
of the firm's financing- investment package. These inter-relationships
appear to make this problem irretreivably non-linear. However, the prob-
lem is not fatal because of the relative rarity of new stock issues.
Conclusion
The pros and cons of applying linear programming to practical prob-
lems in long-range financial planning are about as follows.
Disadvantages
.
— Such models will not fit reality exactly. First,
economies of scale or physical interdependencies among real projects are
clumsily handled at best. Integer constraints alleviate this problem,
but they are not easy to work with.
Second, several aspects of the long-range financial planning problem
may call for non-linear constraints -- for example, debt capacity and
the informational content of dividend policy. It is not clear whether
linear constraints on these variables are adequate for practical pur-
poses.
Third, various sequential aspects of the decision problem (not dis-
cussed in this paper) are difficult to include in a linear program.
Advantages . -- Balanced against these difficulties are substantial
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advantages. The linear programming format is widely understood^ easy to
work with and capable of handling problems of great complexity. It is
applicable to choice among risky assets^ and fully consistent with a theory
of security valuation under uncertainty. It allows simultaneous considera-
tion of the firm's financing and investment decisions. Finally, the
linear format avoids several unfortunate assumptions built into the usual
cost of capital approaches.
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APPENDIX A
RISK-INDEPENDENCE DERIVED FROM
THE SHARPE-LINTNER W)DEL
We consider the k*-" firm which has two or more investment projects
(j=l^ 2j , . .) open to it at t = 0.
R = Risk-free rate of return;
Rj^ = Expected rate of return on the "market" portfolio.
R. = Expected rate of return on firm k's stock;
Xi = Dollar amount invested by firm k in the j^h project.
V^ = Expected value per share of firm k at t = 1. V^ reflects divi-
dends and capital gains^ and Vj^ = (l+Rj^)Pj^.
All rates of return apply a single interval — e.g.j, from t=0 to t=l.
Requirements for Risk-Independence
Risk-independence requires that the change in Pj^ due to adoption of
project 1 be independent of the firm's decisions about other projects. In
other words, that dPj^/dx-^ must be independent of X2, X3, ... • We as-
sxime there are no physical interdependencies.
Since Vk = (l+Rk)Pk.
£li
- _2_ £^ P, ^ (Al)
dxi - 1+Ri, I dxi ^k dxi I •
^"^^^
Thus it is sufficient to show that two terms in brackets are independent
of X2, X3, ... .
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Proof for a Strict One-Period Model
Let Vji^^ be the expected terminal value of project j considered sep-
arately. In a one-period world, Vjj^ is j's cash payoff. Thus, Vj^ =
^ X.V., and dVj^/dx, = V,j^, which is independent of the other x's. (We
are, of course, assuming physical independence.)
20
The Sharpe-Lintner Madel in5>lies
(Rj, - r; = Gov [%,%] (Rm - R),/Var[Rj^] (A2)
where Cov[Rk,RM] = E [(^ - %)(% " %)]•
= ^E[(Vk - Vk)(RM- %)].
The tilde C*^) indicates the random variable rather than its expectation.
^kg = (R^-R)E[(g-^)(R,-V]/Var['4]
= (Rj^ - R) E[(Vik - V^kXRM - Rm^^/^^^I^^^-
which is independent of X2, X3, ... . Partial equilibrium analysis jus-
tifies taking all derivatives involving Rj^ or R as zero.
Proof \^Jhen the Model is applied within a Milti-Period World
The proof given above requires that Vj^ = ^XjVjj^. This is not clearly
true when the terminal value Vj^ is part cash payoff and part residual
market value.
^°See Sharpe [20] or Lintner [9].
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A formal proof for the multiperiod case follows by a sort of back-
wards induction.
1. Consider a horizon H beyond which all projects can yield no
cash flows. By definition Vjj^ for period H can reflect cash
flows only.
2. Prove risk- independence relative to Pj^ at t = H - 1, This is
sufficient to establish Vj^ = ^
-^i^ik ^^ ^ " •'•
3. Prove risk-independence at H - 2, etc.
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